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Abstract. In this paper, we study the problem of factoring an RSA
modulus N = pq in polynomial time, when p is a weak prime, that is, p
can be expressed as ap = u0 + M1u1 + . . . + Mkuk for some k integers
M1, . . . ,Mk and k+2 suitably small parameters a, u0, . . . uk. We further
compute a lower bound for the set of weak moduli, that is, moduli made
of at least one weak prime, in the interval [22n, 22(n+1)] and show that
this number is much larger than the set of RSA prime factors satisfying
Coppersmith’s conditions, effectively extending the likelihood for factor-
ing RSA moduli. We also prolong our findings to moduli composed of
two weak primes.
Keywords: RSA, Cryptanalysis, Factorization, LLL algorithm, Weak primes
1 Introduction
The RSA cryptosystem, invented in 1978 by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [17] is
undoubtedly one of the most popular public key cryptosystems. In the standard
RSA [17], the modulus N = pq is the product of two large primes of the same
bit-size. The public exponent e is an integer such that 1 ≤ e < φ(N) and
gcd(e, φ(N)) = 1 where φ(N) = (p− 1)(q− 1) is the Euler totient function. The
corresponding private exponent is the integer d such that ed ≡ 1 (mod φ(N)). In
RSA, the encryption, decryption, signature generation, and signature verification
require substantial CPU cycles because the time to perform these operations
is proportional to the number of bits in public or secret exponents [17]. To
reduce CPU time necessary for encryption and signature verification, one may
be tempted to use a small public exponent e. This situation has been proven
to be insecure against some small public exponent attacks (see [8] and [9]). To
reduce the decryption and signature generation time, one may also be tempted
to use a small private exponent d. Unfortunately, RSA is also vulnerable to
various powerful short secret exponent attacks such as, the attack of Wiener [20],
? Partially supported by the French SIMPATIC (SIM and PAiring Theory for Infor-
mation and Communications security).
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and the attack of Boneh and Durfee [4] (see also [3]). An alternate way for
increasing the performance of encryption, decryption, signature generation, and
signature verification, without reverting to small exponents, is to use the multi-
prime variant of RSA. The multi-prime RSA is a generalization of the standard
RSA cryptosystem in which the modulus is in the formN = p1p2 · · · pk where k ≥
3 and the pi’s are distinct prime numbers. Combined with the Chinese Remainder
Theorem, a multi-prime RSA is much more efficient than the standard RSA
(see [5]).
In Section 4.1.2 of the X9.31-1998 standard for public key cryptography [1],
some recommendations are presented regarding the generation of the prime fac-
tors of an RSA modulus. For example, it is recommended that the modulus
should have 1024 + 256x bits for x ≥ 0. This requirement deters some factoriza-
tion attacks, such as the Number Field Sieve (NFS) [12] and the Elliptic Curve
Method (ECM) [11]. Another recommendation is that the prime difference |p−q|
should be large, and pq should not be near the ratio of two small integers. These
requirements guard against Fermat factoring algorithm [19], as well as Copper-
smith’s factoring attack on RSA [6] when one knows half of the bits of p. For
example, if N = pq and p, q are of the same bit-size with |p − q| < N1/4, then∣∣∣p− [√N]∣∣∣ < N1/4 (see [16]) where [√N] is the nearest integer to √N , which
means that half of the bits of p are those of [
√
N ] which leads to the factoriza-
tion of N (see [6] and [19]). Observe that the factorization attack of Coppersmith
applies provided that one knows half of the bits of p, that is p is in one of the
forms
p =
{
M1 + u0 with known M1 and unknown u0 ≤ N 14 ,
M1u1 +M0 with known (M1,M0) and unknown u1 ≤ N 14 .
Such primes are called Coppersmith’s weak primes. In the case of p = M1u1+M0
with known M1 and M0, the Euclidean division of q by M1 is in the form
q = M1v1+v0. Hence N = pq = (M1u1+M0)(M1v1+v0) which gives M0v0 ≡ N
(mod M1). Hence, since gcd(M0,M1) = 1, then v0 ≡ NM−10 (mod M1). This
means that when p is of the form p = M1u1 + M0 with known M1 and M0,
then q is necessarily of the form q = M1v1 + v0 with known v0. Coppersmith’s
attack is therefore applicable only when small enough parameters M0 and v0
can be found such that p = M1u1 + M0 and q = M1v1 + v0. This reduces the
applicability of the attack to the set of moduli such that p and q are of the form
defined above.
In this paper, we consider the generalization of Coppersmith’s attack by
considering a more satisfiable decomposition of any of the multipliers of p or q,
i.e., ap or aq not just p or q, effectively leading to an increased set of moduli
that can be factored. We describe two new attacks on RSA with a modulus
N = pq. The first attack applies in the situation that, for given positive integers
M1, . . . ,Mk, one of the prime factors, p say, satisfies a linear equation ap =
u0 + M1u1 + . . . + Mkuk with suitably small integers a and u0, . . . , uk. We call
such prime factors weak primes for the integers M1, . . . ,Mk. The second attack
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applies when both factors p and q are weak for the integers M1, . . . ,Mk. We note
that, for k = 1, the weak primes are such that ap = u0 + M1u1. This includes
the class of Coppersmith’s weak primes. For both attacks, we give an estimation
of the RSA moduli N = pq with a prime factor p ∈ [2n, 2n+1] which is weak for
the integers M,M2, . . . ,Mk where M =
⌈
2
n
2k
⌉
.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give some basic
concepts on integer factorization and lattice reduction as well as an overview of
Coppersmith’s method. In Section 3, we present an attack on an RSA modulus
N = pq with one weak prime factor. In Section 4, we present the second attack
an RSA modulus N = pq with two weak prime factors. We conclude the paper
in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we give the definitions and results that we need to perform our
attacks. These preliminaries include basic concepts on integer factorization and
lattice reduction techniques.
2.1 Integer factorization: the state of the art
Currently, the most powerful algorithm for factorizing large integers is the Num-
ber Field Sieve (NFS) [12]. The heuristic expected time TNFS(N) of the NFS
depends on the bitsize of the integer N to be factored:
TNFS(N) = exp
(
(1.92 + o(1))(logN)1/3(log logN)2/3
)
.
If the integer N has small factors, the Elliptic Curve Method (ECM) [11] for
factoring is substantially faster than the NFS. It can compute a non-trivial factor
p of a composite integer N in an expected runtime TECM :
TECM (p) = exp
((√
2 + o(1)
)
(log p)1/2(log log p)1/2
)
,
which is sub-exponential in the bitsize of the factor p. The largest factor found
so far with the ECM is a 83 decimal digits (275 bits) prime factor of the special
number 7337 + 1 (see [18]).
2.2 Lattice reduction
Let m and n be positive integers with m ≤ n. Let u1, . . . , um ∈ Rn be m linearly
independent vectors. The lattice L spanned by u1, . . . , um is the set
L =
{
m∑
i=1
aiui | ai ∈ Z
}
.
The set {u1, . . . , um} is called a lattice basis for L. The dimension (or rank)
of the lattice L is dim(L) = m, and L is called full rank if m = n. It is often
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useful to represent the lattice L by the m × n matrix M whose rows are the
coefficients of the vectors u1, . . . , um. The determinant (or volume) of L is defined
as det(L) = √M ·M t. When L is full rank, the determinant reduces to det(L) =
|det(M)|. The Euclidean norm of a vector v = ∑mi=1 aiui ∈ L is defined as
‖v‖ = √∑mi=1 a2i . As a lattice has infinitely many bases, some bases are better
than others, and a very important task is to find a basis with small vectors
{b1, . . . , bm} called the reduced basis. This task is very hard in general, however,
the LLL algorithm proposed by Lenstra, Lenstra, and Lova´sz [13] finds a basis of
a lattice with relatively small vectors in polynimial time. The following theorem
determines the sizes of the reduced basis vectors obtained with LLL (see [15] for
more details).
Theorem 1. Let L be a lattice spanned by a basis {u1, . . . , um}. The LLL algo-
rithm applied to L outputs a reduced basis {b1, . . . , bm} with
‖b1‖ ≤ ‖b2‖ ≤ . . . ≤ ‖bi‖ ≤ 2
m(m−1)
4(m−i+1) det(L) 1m+i−1 , for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
The existence of a short nonzero vector in a lattice is guaranteed by a result of
Minkowski stating that every m-dimensional lattice L contains a non-zero vector
v with ‖v‖ ≤ √m det(L) 1m . On the other hand, the Gaussian Heuristic asserts
that the norm γ1 of the shortest vector of a random lattice satisfies
γ1 ≈
√
dim(L)
2pie
det(L) 1dim(L) .
Hereafter, we will use this result as an estimation for the expected minimum
norm of a non-zero vector in a lattice.
2.3 Coppersmith’s Method
In 1996, Coppersmith [6] presented two techniques based on LLL to find small
integer roots of univariate modular polynomials or of bivariate integer polyno-
mials. Coppersmith showed how to apply his technique to factorize an RSA
modulus N = pq with q < p < 2q when half of the least or the most significant
bits of p is known.
Theorem 2. Let N = pq be an RSA modulus with q < p < 2q. Let M0 and M1
be two positif integers. If p = M1 + u0 with u0 < N
1
4 or if p = M1u1 +M0 with
u1 < N
1
4 , then N can be factored in time polynomial in logN .
Coppersmith’s technique extends to polynomials in more variables, but the
method becomes heuristic. The problem of finding small roots of linear mod-
ular polynomials f(x1, . . . , xn) = a1x1 + a2x2 + + anxn + an+1 (mod p) for
some unknown p that divides the known modulus N has been studied using
Coppersmith’s technique by Herrmann and May [10]. The following result, due
to Lu, Zhang and Lin [14] gives a sufficient condition under which modular roots
can be found efficiently.
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Theorem 3 (Lu, Zhang, Lin). Let N be a composite integer with a divi-
sor pu such that p ≥ Nβ. Let f(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Z[x1, . . . , xn] be a homogenous
linear polynomial. Then one can find all the solutions (y1, . . . , yn) of the equa-
tion f(x1, . . . , xn) = 0 mod p
v, v ≤ u with gcd(y1, . . . , yn) = 1 and |y1| <
Nδ1 , . . . , |yn| < Nδn if
n∑
i=1
δi ≤ u
v
(
1−
(
1− u
v
β
) n
n−1 − n
(
1− n−1
√
1− u
v
β
)(
1− u
v
β
))
.
The time complexity of the algorithm for finding such sulution (y1, . . . , yn) is
polynomial in logN .
3 The Attack with One Weak Prime Factor
3.1 The Attack
In this section, we present an attack to factor an RSA modulus N = pq when
p satisfies a linear equation in the form ap = u0 + M1u1 + . . .Mkuk for a suit-
ably small positive integer a and suitably small integers u0, u1, . . . , uk where
M1, . . . ,Mk are given positive integers. Such prime factor p is called a weak
prime for the integers M1, . . . ,Mk.
Theorem 4. Let N = pq be an RSA modulus such that p > Nβ and M1, . . . ,Mk
be k positive integers with M1 < M2 < . . . < Mk. Suppose that there exists a
positive integer a, and k+1 integers ui, i = 0, . . . , k such that ap = u0+M1u1+
. . .+Mkuk with max(ui) < N
δ and
δ <
1
k + 1
(
1− (1− β) k+1k − (k + 1)
(
1− k
√
1− β
)
(1− β)
)
.
Then one can factor N in polynomial time.
Proof. Let M1, . . . ,Mk be k positive integers such that M1 < M2 < . . . < Mk.
Suppose that ap = u0 +M1u1 + . . .+Mkuk, that is (u0, . . . , uk) is a solution of
the modular polynomial equation
x0 +M1x1 + . . .+Mkxk = 0 (mod p). (1)
Suppose that |ui| < N δ for i = 0, . . . , k. Using n = k + 1, u = 1 and v = 1 in
Theorem 3, means that the equation (1) can be solved in polynomial time, i.e.,
finding (u0, . . . , uk) if
(k + 1)δ <
(
1− (1− β) k+1k − (k + 1)
(
1− k
√
1− β
)
(1− β)
)
,
which gives the bound
δ <
1
k + 1
(
1− (1− β) k+1k − (k + 1)
(
1− k
√
1− β
)
(1− β)
)
.
This terminates the proof. uunionsq
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Remark 1. For a balanced RSA modulus, the prime factors p and q are of the
same bit size. Then p > Nβ with β = 12 . Hence, the condition on δ becomes
δ <
1
k + 1
(
1−
(
1
2
) k+1
k
)
− 1
2
(
1−
(
1
2
) 1
k
)
. (2)
In Table 1, we give the bound for δ for given β and k.
k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8 k = 9 k = 10
β = 0.5 0.125 0.069 0.047 0.036 0.029 0.024 0.021 0.018 0.016 0.015
β = 0.6 0.180 0.101 0.071 0.054 0.044 0.037 0.032 0.028 0.025 0.022
β = 0.7 0.245 0.142 0.100 0.077 0.063 0.053 0.046 0.046 0.036 0.032
Table 1. Upper bounds for δ by Theorem 4.
Remark 2. We note that Coppersmith’s weak primes correspond to moduli N =
pq with q < p < 2q where one of the prime factors is of the form p = M1 +u0 or
p = M1u1 +M0 with u0, u1 < N
0.25 as mentioned in Theorem 2. This a special
case of the equation of Theorem 4. Indeed, we can solve the equations p = M1+u0
and p = M1u1 + M0 when |u0|, |u1| < N 14 . Alternatively, Coppersmith’s weak
primes correspond to the cell (k, 2β) = (1, 0.25) in Table 1.
3.2 Numerical Examples
Example 1. Let
N =10009752886312109988022778227550577837081215192005129864784685
185744046801879577421186031638557426812962407688357511963709141,
be a 412-bit RSA modulus with N = pq where q < p < 2q. Then p and q are
balanced and p ≈ N 12 ≈ 2206. Hence for β = 0.5, we have p > Nβ . Suppose
that p satisfies an equation of the form ap = u0 + Mu1 + M
2u2. Typically,
M2 ≈ N 12 , that is M ≈ N 14 . So let M = 2100. For β = 0.5 and k = 2,
Table (1) gives the bound δ < 0.069. Assume therefore that the parameters ui
satisfy |ui| < N0.069 ≈ 228 for i = 0, 1, 2. By applying Theorem 4 we should
find u0, u1 and u2 as long as u0, u1, u2 < 2
28. We apply the method of Lu et
al. [14] with m = 4 and t = 1. This gives a 35-dimensional lattice. Applying
the LLL algorithm [13], we find a reduced basis with multivariate polynomials
fi(x1, x2, x3) ∈ Z[x1, x2, x3], i = 1, . . . , 3. Applying the Gro¨bner basis technique
for solving a system of polynomial equations, we get u0 = 9005, u1 = 7123,
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u2 = 3915. Using these values, we can compute ap = u0 + Mu1 + M
2u2 from
which we deduce p = gcd(u0 +Mu1 +M
2u2, N), that is
p = 123356126338704841740132972382836883609800988209539117002682143.
Finally, we can compute q = Np , that is
q = 81145162250214072465980396192562821802697970661432623765038987.
Note here that there is no linear decomposition of p in the form p = M1 + u0
nor p = M1u1 + M0 with u0, u1 < N
0.25 that makes p vulnerable to the attack
of Coppersmith. This shows that the modulus N is vulnerable to our attack,
while it is not vulnerable to Coppersmith’s attack. Finally, the overall recorded
execution time for our attack using an off-the-shelf computer was 17 seconds.
Example 2. In [2], Bernstein et al. discovered many prime factors with special
forms. Many of these primes were found by computing the greatest common
divisor of a collection of RSA moduli. Others were found by applying Copper-
smith’s technique. We show below that our attack can find some primes among
the list of Bernstein et al. One of these primes is
p =0xc00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002f9,
=10055855947456947824680518748654384595609524365444295033292671082
79132302255516023260140572362517757076752389363986453814031541210
8959927459825236754563833.
Using M = 2510, we get p = 3M + 761 = Mu1 + u0 where u1 = 3 and u0 = 761.
We have u1, u0 < N
δ with δ ≈ 0.007 which is less than the bound 0.125 in
Table 1 for a 1024 bit-size RSA modulus N with β = 0.5, and k = 1. This
implies that the conditions for Theorem 4 are satisfied and our method finds p
when used in any RSA modulus.
Example 3. Now, consider this other example from the list of Bernstein et al. [2]
p =0xc000b80000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000068000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000251
=1005600299430066190917858574741029677291519034741120712409376115
2520749216065545598886037221777994938111659319232428746318812487
609513837263772711701709393
Then p has the form p = 3145774M7 + 27262976M3 + 593 = M7u7 +M
3u3 +u0
where M = 270. The coefficients u7, u3 and u0 satisfy u7, u3, u0 < N
δ with
δ ≈ 0.016 while the bound of Theorem 4 is 0.021 (see Table 1 for k = 7 and
β = 0.5). Again, this shows that our method will find the factorization of any
RSA modulus that is a multiple of p.
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3.3 The Number of Single Weak Primes in an Interval
In this section, we consider two positive integers n and M and present a study
of the weak primes with M , that is the primes p ∈ [2n, 2n+1] such that there
exists a positive integer a that gives the decomposition
ap =
k∑
i=0
M iui
where |ui| < Nδ and δ satisfies Theorem 4. We show that the number of the RSA
moduli N in the interval [22n, 22(n+1)] with a weak prime factor p ∈ [2n, 2n+1]
is polynomial in 2n. That is, this number is lower bounded by 2η where η > 12 .
We call such a class weak RSA Moduli in the interval [22n, 22(n+1)].
Theorem 5. Let n be a positive integer. For k ≥ 1, define M = ⌈2nk ⌉. Let N
be the set of the weak RSA moduli N ∈ [22n, 22(n+1)] such that N = pq, p and
q are of the same bitsize, p > q, and p =
⌊∑k
i=0M
iui
a
⌋
+ b ∈ [2n, 2n+1] for some
small integers b, a < Nδ and |ui| < Nδ for i = 0, . . . , k with
δ =
1
k + 1
(
1−
(
1
2
) k+1
k
)
− 1
2
(
1−
(
1
2
) 1
k
)
.
Then the cardinality of N satisfies #N ≥ 2η where
η = (1 + 2(k + 1)δ)n+ log2
(
(n− 1)
n(n+ 1) log(2)
)
.
Proof. Let N be an RSA moduli. Suppose that N ∈ [22n, 22(n+1)] with N = pq
where p and q are of the same bitsize. Since p ≈ N 12 , then p ∈ [2n, 2n+1].
Suppose further that for some positive integer a, we have ap =
∑k
i=0M
iui.
Then
Mk =
ap−∑k−1i=0 M iui
uk
≈ a
uk
p,
which implies M ≈ p 1k ≈ N 12k . Now, define
M =
⌈
N
1
2k
⌉
=
⌈
2
n
k
⌉
,
where dxe is the integer greater or equal to x. This yields 2n ≤ Mk ≤ 2n+1.
Consider the set
P =
{
p =
⌊∑k
i=0M
iui
a
⌋
+ b, p is prime, | p ∈ [2n, 2n+1] , a < N δ, |ui| < Nδ} ,
where δ satisfies (2). Here b is as small as possible so that
⌊∑k
i=0M
iui
a
⌋
+ b is
prime. Also, since Mk is the leading term, then observe that∑k
i=0M
iui
a
−Mk = uk − a
a
Mk +
∑k
i=1M
iui
a
.
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To ensure p ∈ [2n, 2n+1], we consider only the situation where uk ≥ a. Hence,
using the bounds a < Nδ and |ui| < N δ for i = 0, . . . , k − 1, we get a lower
bound for the number of possibilities for a and for ui, which themselves set a
lower bound for the cardinality of P as follows:
#P ≥ ⌊Nδ⌋ ⌊Nδ⌋k ≈ N (k+1)δ ≈ 22(k+1)nδ. (3)
On the other hand, the prime number theorem asserts that the number pi(x) of
the primes less than x is
pi(x) ≈ x
log(x)
.
Hence, the number of primes in the interval
[
2n, 2n+1
]
is approximately
pi
(
2n+1
)− pi (2n) ≈ 2n+1
log (2n+1)
− 2
n
log (2n)
=
(n− 1)2n
n(n+ 1) log(2)
. (4)
It follows that the number of RSA moduli N = pq ∈ [22n, 22(n+1)] with a weak
factor p ∈ P and q ∈ [2n, 2n+1] is at least #(N ) ≥ #P × (pi (2n+1)− pi (2n)) .
Using 3 and 4, we get
#(N ) ≥ 22(k+1)nδ × (n− 1)2
n
n(n+ 1) log(2)
=
(n− 1)
n(n+ 1) log(2)
× 2(1+2(k+1)δ)n
= 2η,
where
η = (1 + 2(k + 1)δ)n+ log2
(
(n− 1)
n(n+ 1) log(2)
)
.
This terminates the proof. uunionsq
Table 2 presents a list of values of the bound η in terms of k and n. In Table 2,
k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7
n = 1
2
log2(N) = 512 759 715 698 689 684 680 677
n = 1
2
log2(N) = 1024 1526 1438 1404 1386 1375 1368 1362
n = 1
2
log2(N) = 2048 3061 2885 2818 2782 2759 2744 2733
Table 2. Lower bounds for η under Theorem 5.
we see that in the situation (β, k) = (0.5, 1), the number #(N ) of 1024-bits RSA
moduli N = pq ∈ [21024, 21026] with a weak factor p is at least #(N ) ≥ 2759.
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Observe that the number of RSA moduli with a weak Coppersmith’s prime
factor in the same interval is approximately N
1
4 · N 12 ≈ 2768. Actually, weak
Coppersmith’s prime are of the form p = M1 + u0 or p = M1u1 +M0 with one
unknown parameter u0 or u1, while our weak primes for k = 1 are of the form
p = M1u1 + u0 with two unknown parameters u0 or u1. This shows that our
weak prime factors are different from weak Coppersmith primes.
4 The Attack with Two Weak Prime factors
4.1 The Attack
In this section, we present an attack on RSA with a modulus N = pq when both
the prime factors p and q are weak primes.
Theorem 6. Let N = pq be an RSA modulus and M be a positive integer. Let
k ≥ 1. Suppose that there exist integers a, b, ui and vi, i = 1, . . . , k such that
ap =
∑k
i=0M
iui and bq =
∑k
i=0M
ivi with |ui|, |vi| < Nδ and
δ <
1
2k + 1
+
log
(
2k3
)
2(2k + 1) log(N)
+
log(2k + 1)− log(2pie)
4 log(N)
− log
(
4k3
)
4 log(N)
.
Then one can factor N in polynomial time.
Proof. Suppose that ap =
∑k
i=0M
iui and bq =
∑k
i=0M
ivi. Then multiplying
ap and bq, we get
abN =
2k∑
i=0
M iwi, with wi =
i∑
j=0
ujvi−j .
This can be transformed into the equation
M2kx2k +M
2k−1x2k−1 + . . .+Mx1 − yN = −x0, (5)
with the solution (x2k, x2k−1, . . . , x1, y, x0) = (w2k, w2k, . . . , w1, ab, u0v0). For
i = 0, . . . , k, suppose that |ui|, |vi| < Nδ. Since for i = 0, . . . , 2k, the maximal
number of terms in wi is k, we get
|xi| = |wi| ≤ kmax
j
(|uj |) ·max
j
(|vj |) < kN2δ. (6)
Let C be a constant to be fixed later. Consider the lattice L generated by the
row vectors of the matrix
M(L) =

1 0 0 . . . 0 CM2k
0 1 . . . 0 0 CM2k−1
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
0 0 0 . . . 1 CM
0 0 0 . . . 0 −CN

. (7)
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The dimension of the lattice L is dim(L) = 2k+1 and its determinant is det(L) =
CN . According to the Gaussian Heuristic, the length of the shortest non-zero
vector of the lattice L is approximately σ(L) with
σ(L) ≈
√
dim(L)
2pie
det(L) 1dim(L) =
√
2k + 1
2pie
(CN)
1
2k+1 .
Consider the vector v = (x2k, x2k−1, . . . , x1,−Cx0). Then, using (5), we get
(x2k, x2k−1, . . . , x1,−Cx0) = (x2k, xk−1, . . . , x1, y) ·M(L).
This means that v ∈ L. Consequently, if C satisfies ‖v‖ ≤ σ(L), then, by the
Gaussian Heuristic, v is the shortest vector of L. Using the bound (6), the length
of the vector v satisfies
‖v‖2 = C2x20 +
2k∑
i=1
x2i ≤
(
C2 +
2k∑
i=1
k2
)
N4δ =
(
C2 + 2k3
)
N4δ.
Let C be a positive integer satisfying C ≤
√
2k3. Then the norm of the vector
v satisfies ‖v‖2 < 4k3N4δ. Hence, using the Gaussian approximation σ(L), the
inequality ‖v‖ ≤ σ(L) is satisfied if
2k
3
2N2δ ≤
√
2k + 1
2pie
(
2
1
2 k
3
2N
) 1
2k+1
.
Solving for δ, we get
δ <
1
2k + 1
+
log
(
2k3
)
2(2k + 1) log(N)
+
log(2k + 1)− log(2pie)
4 log(N)
− log
(
4k3
)
4 log(N)
.
If δ satisfies the former bound, then the LLL algorithm, applied to the lattice L
will output the vector v = (x2k, x2k−1, . . . , x1,−Cx0) from which, we deduce
w2k = |x2k|, w2k−1 = |x2k−1|, . . . , w1 = |x1|, w0 = | − Cx0|
C
.
Using the coefficients wi, i = 1, . . . , 2k, we construct the polynomial P (X) =
w2kX
2k + w2k−1X2k−1 + . . .+ w1X + w0. Factoring P (X), we get
P (X) =
(
k∑
i=0
M iui
)(
k∑
i=0
M ivi
)
,
from which we deduce all the values ui and vi for i = 1, . . . , k. Using each
ui and vi for i = 1, . . . , k, we get ap =
∑k
i=0M
iui and finally obtain p =
gcd
(∑k
i=0M
iui, N
)
which in turn gives q = Nq . This terminates the proof. uunionsq
In Table 3, we give the bound for δ for a given k and a given size of the RSA
modulus.
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k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5
log2(N) = 1024 0.332 0.199 0.141 0.109 0.089
log2(N) = 2048 0.333 0.199 0.142 0.110 0.090
Table 3. Upper bounds for δ with Theorem 6.
4.2 Examples
Example 4. Consider the 234 bits RSA modulus
N = 18128727522177729435347634587168292968987318316812435932174117774340029.
Let M = 250. Suppose further that the prime factors p and q are such that
ap = M2u2 + Mu1 + u0 and bq = M
2v2 + Mv1 + v0, that is k = 2 with the
notation of Theorem 6. We built the matrix (7) with C =
√
2k3 = 4 and applied
the LLL algorithm [13]. We got a new basis, where the last row is:
(w4, w3, w2, w1,−Cw0) =
(30223231819936, 68646317659290, 109044283791446, 80821741694637,−162291153390444).
From this, we form the polynomial P (X) = w4X
4+w3X
3+w2X
2+w1X
1+w0.
which factors as:
P (X) =
(
4678994X2 + 5832048X + 4871673
) (
6459344X2 + 6620037X + 8328307
)
.
From this, we deduce
u2 = 4678994, u1 = 5832048, u0 = 4871673,
v2 = 6459344, v1 = 6620037, v0 = 8328307.
Using these values, we compute
ap = M2u2 +Mu1 + u0 = 5931329552564290566528965219451557369,
bq = M2v2 +Mv1 + v0 = 8188191298680619668680362464158618739.
and obtain
p = gcd(ap,N) = 126198501118389160989977983392586327,
q = gcd(bq,N) = 143652478924221397696146709897519627.
This leads to the factorization of N = pq. We note that the first attack described
in Section 3 does not succeed to factor N . Indeed, we have log(maxi(|vi|))logN ≈ 0.098
which is larger than the value δ = 0.069 for k = 2 and β = 0.5 in Table 1.
Finally, the overall recorded execution time for our attack using an off-the-shelf
computer was 12 seconds.
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4.3 The Number of Double Weak Primes in an Interval
In this section, we consider two positive integers n and M and present a study
of the double weak primes with M , that is the primes p, q ∈ [2n, 2n+1] such that
there exists positive integer a and b that give the decompositions:
ap =
k∑
i=0
M iui, bq =
k∑
i=0
M ivi
where |ui| < Nδ, |vi| < Nδ and δ satisfies Theorem 6. We show that the number
of the RSA moduli N in the interval [22n, 22(n+1)] with a weak prime factors
p, q ∈ [2n, 2n+1] is lower bounded by 2η2 where η2 > 12 .
Theorem 7. Let n be a positive integer. For k ≥ 1, define M = ⌈2nk ⌉. Let N
be the set of the weak RSA moduli N ∈ [22n, 22(n+1)] such that N = pq with
p =
⌊∑k
i=0M
iui
a
⌋
+ u, q =
⌊∑k
i=0M
ivi
b
⌋
+ v, p, q ∈ [2n, 2n+1] for some small
integers u, v, a < N δ, b < N δ, |ui| < Nδ and |vi| < Nδ for i = 0, . . . , k with
δ =
1
k + 1
(
1−
(
1
2
) k+1
k
)
− 1
2
(
1−
(
1
2
) 1
k
)
.
Then the cardinality of N is at least #N ≥ 2η2 where η2 = 4(k + 1)nδ.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 5, the number of prime numbers p ∈ [2n, 2n+1]
such that p =
∑k
i=0M
iui
a + u with |ui| < 22nδ is
#P ≥ 22(k+1)nδ.
Then, the number N2 of RSA modulus N ∈
[
22n, 22(n+1)
]
with N = pq, where
both p and q are weak primes is at least
#N2 ≥ 24(k+1)nδ = 2η2 ,
where η2 = 4(k + 1)nδ. This terminates the proof. uunionsq
In Table 3, we present a list of values of the bound η2 in terms of k and n.
k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7
n = 512 512 424 390 372 361 353 348
n = 1024 1024 848 780 744 722 707 696
n = 2048 2048 1696 1560 1489 1444 1414 1392
Table 4. Lower bounds for η2 under Theorem 7.
14 Abderrahmane Nitaj and Tajjeeddine Rachidi
5 Conclusions
In this paper we presented and illustrated two attacks based on factoring RSA
moduli with weak primes. We further computed lower bounds for the sets of weak
moduli -that is, moduli made of at least one or two weak prime respectively- in
the interval [22n, 22(n+1)] and showed that these sets are much larger than the
set of RSA prime factors satisfying Coppersmith’s conditions, which effectively
extending the likelihood for factoring RSA moduli.
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